How does asset mobility affect the provision of property rights, and whose preferences matter? This research note develops a formal model that highlights how owners of more mobile assets may have weaker incentives for property‑rights enforcement, and how asset mobility can alter competitive dynamics among heterogeneous firms. Amy Pond evaluates these model implications using survey data from business executives in Latin America and cross‑national, time‑series evidence on firm profits, aiming to reconcile literatures on firm heterogeneity and property‑rights development.
Owners of mobile assets have smaller enforcement stakes. Uses Latin American executive surveys and cross‑national time‑series on profits. Focus on heterogeneous firm competition and property‑rights returns.
Data and methods
The author combines two empirical sources stated in the abstract: a survey of business executives conducted in Latin America, and cross‑national, time‑series data on firm profits. The analysis is framed by a formal theoretical model that contrasts owners with mobile versus immobile assets and considers competition among heterogeneous firms. The abstract reports empirical evaluation of the model propositions rather than full methodological details.
Main findings
According to the abstract, executives who report holding less mobile assets indicate a greater need for improvements in property rights. Cross‑national analyses show that stronger property rights are associated with higher firm profits, but this profitability effect is concentrated among firms with substantial immobile assets. The results are presented as consistent with the model’s prediction that mobile assets reduce the private benefits of property‑rights enforcement.
- Business executives with less mobile assets report greater demand for property‑rights improvements.
- Cross‑national gains from property rights are observed mainly for firms holding immobile assets.
