When Criminals Provide Order in Mexico and Central America: Need, Resistance, and Control

What The Authors Ask

Javier Osorio and Susan Brewer-Osorio investigate why criminal organizations sometimes step in to govern local communities. They challenge explanations that treat criminal governance as merely a top-down imposition, proposing instead that both bottom-up demand for help and top-down incentives to provide coercion shape how and when criminals govern.

A Theory of Demand and Supply

The authors develop a theory in which civilians' basic needs create demand for criminal-provided services, while criminals' security concerns and strategic goals shape the supply of aid or coercion. The theory highlights three core factors that determine whether criminal governance emerges: economic distress, communities' capacity to organize or resist, and the strength or responsiveness of the formal state.

How the Study Measures Support

Osorio and Brewer-Osorio test their theory with multiple list experiments—survey techniques designed to elicit truthful responses on sensitive topics—fielded in Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. These experiments aim to estimate clandestine attitudes and behaviors related to citizens' willingness to seek criminal aid and perceptions of criminals' incentives to provide help or coercion.

Key Findings

• Demand side: Economic difficulties and a community's articulation or resistance capacity significantly shape civilians' demand for criminal aid. Poorer households and less organized communities show stronger demand for criminal-provided services.
• Supply side: Criminal actors generally do not meet community economic needs. When they do offer assistance, it tends to be limited and strategically aimed at neutralizing potential civilian resistance or competing with the state.
• Strategic shift under worse conditions: As economic conditions deteriorate further, criminal groups are more likely to impose coercive measures such as lockdowns rather than expand substantial aid.

Implications for Theory and Policy

The results support a combined demand-and-supply account of criminal governance: civilians' needs matter for why they turn to illicit actors, but criminal responses are driven primarily by security and competition dynamics, not by broad welfare provision. For policymakers, the findings imply that reducing basic economic vulnerability and strengthening community channels for articulation and accountability can lower the local demand for illicit governance; meanwhile, state responses that change the strategic incentives facing criminal groups are necessary to limit coercive supply.