How Presidential Elections Unsettle European Party Systems, 1848–2020

Why This Question Matters

A popularly elected presidency is often promoted as democratic empowerment, but Fernando Casal Bértoa and Till Weber ask whether it also weakens predictable party politics at the executive level. The study targets a long-standing concern in comparative politics: that electing presidents directly can destabilize competitive party systems and complicate stable government formation.

What the Authors Investigate

The key concept is party system closure—the extent to which party interactions, especially over cabinet formation and executive cooperation, crystallize into predictable patterns. The authors test whether presidential elections reduce party system closure across European democracies from 1848 to 2020 and probe the mechanisms behind any effects.

New Data and Methods

Casal Bértoa and Weber assemble a novel dataset covering all European democracies since 1848 and combine quantitative panel analyses with illustrative case material. Their empirical strategy isolates two pathways by which presidential elections can weaken closure: direct effects on government formation (especially under strong presidencies) and indirect effects via disruption of electoral and legislative politics that then transmit to executive politics.

Key Findings

• Presidential elections undermine party system closure across Europe in both historical and contemporary cases.
• The dominant pathway is a direct effect: the coexistence of presidential and legislative coalitions complicates predictable patterns of government formation at the cabinet level, particularly where presidencies hold substantial power.
• A secondary, indirect pathway operates when presidential contests disturb electoral and legislative dynamics, which in turn feed instability into executive arrangements.
• Results are robust across panel specifications and supported by targeted case illustrations.

What This Means for Reformers and Scholars

These results suggest that constitutional designers should weigh how introducing or empowering direct presidential elections alters executive-party linkages. For comparative researchers, the findings show that institutional choice—electing presidents directly—has long-range consequences for the structure and predictability of party competition and government-making.

Where to Read It

This article appears in the British Journal of Political Science and contributes new data and theory to debates about presidentialism, party systems, and executive-legislative relations in comparative politics.