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Leniency in Civil Wars: How Truces Attract Selfish Rebels

Civil Warrebel recruitmentNortheast Indiaconjunctive methodsInternational Relations@AJPS1 R file2 datasetsDataverse
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Rebel groups often assume truces allow them to recruit freely and build strength. This study uses innovative evidence from Northeast India's five conflict zones, showing lenient conditions can ultimately weaken rebel organizations by attracting low-commitment recruits.

Findings:

* Contrary to assumptions, truce periods may inadvertently undermine long-term rebel viability.

* The focus on safety and comfort draws selfish individuals who are less likely to stay committed or behave ethically during active conflict.

This research offers a counterintuitive perspective:

• Disproportionately drawing in opportunistic recruits through lenient recruitment conditions (highlighted below)

• Revealing how such individuals can defect later, abandon posts, or mistreat civilians

• Tracking behavioral shifts over time as truces transition back to conflict

Methodology:

* Quantitative survey data collected from nearly 400 potential recruits in local hotspots (using attitudinal questions and conjoint experiments)

* Qualitative interviews with rebel leaders, soldiers, and civilian observers across multiple regions.

The study suggests that policymakers should reconsider truces as purely restorative periods for rebels.

Article card for article: Good Times and Bad Apples: Rebel Recruitment in Crackdown and Truce
Good Times and Bad Apples: Rebel Recruitment in Crackdown and Truce was authored by Kolby Hanson. It was published by Wiley in AJPS in 2021.
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American Journal of Political Science