Aerial Coca Spraying Increased Violence in Colombia, New Study Shows

Why This Question Matters

Why do state efforts to suppress illicit economies sometimes make violence worse? Juan Felipe Campos, Camilo Nieto‑Matiz, and Luis Schenoni examine how a high‑visibility counter‑narcotics tactic—airborne spraying of coca crops—shapes armed conflict dynamics in Colombia. The study probes whether eradication operations stabilize the state’s authority over illicit markets or instead upset local power balances and provoke more violence.

What the Authors Did

The authors analyze municipal‑level data from 2000 to 2015 on aerial coca eradication and patterns of armed violence across Colombia. Their approach compares violence trends in municipalities affected by spraying to those that were not, focusing on how different kinds of armed actors respond to eradication efforts and how civilian populations are affected.

Key Findings

• Aerial spraying is associated with higher overall levels of violence in municipalities where it is carried out.
• Spraying tends to provoke retaliatory attacks aimed at the state and to spark turf wars among criminal and paramilitary groups.
• Civilian victimization rises in areas targeted by eradication, reflecting intensified competition and coercion by armed actors.
• Responses vary by actor: paramilitaries and criminal organizations escalate violence sharply after spraying, while insurgent groups show a steadier level of violence that appears less tied to eradication timing.

How the Results Are Interpreted

Campos, Nieto‑Matiz, and Schenoni argue that large, episodic interventions like aerial eradication can destabilize local strategic equilibria. By disrupting coca production and the informal arrangements that structure control over territory and resources, spraying can create openings for violent competition and retaliation rather than restoring state control.

What This Means for Policy and Research

The findings caution that well‑intentioned, large‑scale counter‑narcotics operations can have perverse security effects if they fail to account for local power structures and the incentives of different armed actors. The study highlights the importance of designing interventions that consider how eradication reshapes on‑the‑ground bargaining and control in illicit economies.