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How Denials and Excuses Shield States From International Backlash

Public accusations of international law violations often trigger a rhetorical fight over responsibility and meaning. Political costs for accused governments depend less on the facts than on a contest of messages: governments try to reshape perceptions, while international organizations (IOs) push back to defend the law.

πŸ”Ž What Was Tested

A set of survey experiments measured how different kinds of messaging alter support for punishment after allegations of wrongdoing. The experiments focused on two types of claims about violations:

  • contesting the factual information about the alleged act,
  • arguing the law is not appropriate in this case,
  • citing extenuating or mitigating circumstances.

The samples included the US public and a global sample of diplomatic elites, and the scenarios involved alleged military aggression and human rights violations.

πŸ§ͺ How the Evidence Was Collected

  • Randomized survey vignettes presented allegations of wrongdoing followed by varied government messages and/or IO rebuttals.
  • Outcomes measured public and elite support for punitive responses.

πŸ“Œ Key Findings

  • Government denials and claims about mitigating circumstances consistently reduce punitive attitudes.
  • IO rebuttals are effective at countering simple denials but only partially offset claims that appeal to mitigating circumstances or challenge the law’s applicability.
  • These patterns hold across the US public sample and the global diplomatic-elite sample, showing similar directional effects in both audiences.

βš–οΈ Why It Matters

  • Political costs of noncompliance are shaped by rhetorical competition, not only by objective evidence.
  • IOs can blunt some government messaging but face limits when states invoke excusing circumstances or legal contestation.
  • The findings offer a framework for analyzing how strategic messaging influences enforcement and the practical reach of international law.
American Political Science Review
Smoke and Mirrors: Strategic Messaging and the Politics of Noncompliance was authored by Julia C. Morse and Tyler Pratt. It was published in APSR in 2026. Find on Google Scholar10.1017/S0003055425100877
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