UN Staff Prefer Earmarked Funds for Their Own Work — But Not Bigger Budgets

Why Earmarking Matters

International organizations (IOs) increasingly rely on earmarked voluntary contributions from member states and non-state actors as budgets tighten. Scholars and critics worry that earmarking creates a trade-off: it boosts resources for specific activities but reduces organizational control and may undermine performance.

What Heinzel, Reinsberg, and Siauwijaya Did

This registered-report study uses a novel elite survey experiment to probe how IO staff evaluate different types of earmarking. The authors randomized survey treatments that described alternative earmarking arrangements and asked staff to assess their desirability and likely consequences for funding and overheads.

Who Took Part

Respondents were staff members from six United Nations organizations, providing an inside view of bureaucratic preferences among professional IO personnel who routinely manage and implement earmarked funds.

Key Findings

• Staff display a clear preference for earmarked contributions that support their own area of work compared with other types of earmarking.
• Despite these preferences, types of earmarking did not change how much funding staff judged appropriate for their organization.
• Earmarking preferences also did not alter expectations about the overheads the organization would charge on those funds.

Why This Matters for IO Resourcing

The results suggest that while international bureaucrats favor funding tied to their units, those preferences do not translate into calls for larger budgets or different overhead policies. These findings shed light on the motivations shaping bureaucratic reactions to donor-driven funding and inform debates about the costs and benefits of expanding earmarked financing in IOs.