🗝️ Central Question
Should turnout in mass elections be voluntary or compulsory? Existing normative defenses of compulsory voting often rest on contested claims about a moral duty to vote or the democratic legitimacy of high turnout. This article strengthens the normative case by arguing that compulsory voting can improve democratic outcomes by reducing political polarization—a force shown to increase the risk of democratic backsliding.
📐 Spatial-Model Argument
Drawing on spatial models of electoral competition, the argument proceeds as follows:
- Compulsory voting reduces the ability of more extreme voters to wield a credible threat of abstention born of alienation.
- With that threat curtailed, parties face stronger incentives to move their platforms toward the median voter’s preferences.
- Party polarization—measured as the distance between party platforms—therefore falls directly under compulsory voting.
🔎 What Is Shown
- Theoretical demonstration using standard spatial models that compulsory voting can shift party platforms toward the center.
- A clear mechanism: limiting strategic abstention by alienated extremists reduces their leverage over party positioning.
- Polarization is defined and treated explicitly as platform distance, linking the mechanism to a measurable outcome.
⚖️ Objections and Limits Considered
Potential normative and empirical objections are examined, and scope conditions are articulated that delimit when compulsory voting is likely to reduce polarization.
🌍 Why It Matters
Reducing party polarization has direct implications for democratic resilience because polarization can fuel democratic backsliding. By showing a plausible pathway from compulsory voting to less polarized party competition, the article offers a novel, policy-relevant reason to reconsider compulsory turnout as a democratic reform.
