Do Leftist local governments push informal workers into formal jobs, or ease enforcement and improve informal conditions? This study asks whether mayors from Brazil's Workers' Party (PT) increase enforcement against enterprises that hire noncontract, informal-sector workers or instead adopt forbearant policies. Using a close-election regression discontinuity design at the municipal level, the article examines how left-wing victories affect enforcement and the size and conditions of the informal sector.
Regression discontinuity design Focus on municipal governments Informal-sector enforcement and conditions
Data and methods
The author applies a close-election regression-discontinuity design comparing narrowly decided municipal elections in Brazil to estimate causal effects of PT mayoral victories. The abstract identifies the unit of analysis as local (mayoral) governments and emphasizes the use of election-based quasi-experimental variation to isolate the effect of leftist incumbency.
Main findings
According to the abstract, mayors from the Workers' Party (PT) ‘‘slow down enforcement and improve conditions in the informal sector’’ rather than promoting a shift toward formal employment. The author interprets this pattern as reflecting a broader dilemma for leftist parties balancing protections for precarious informal workers and those in full-time formal employment amid segmented labor markets and constrained welfare states.
- The analysis focuses on PT (Workers' Party) mayors and municipal enforcement toward informal-sector employers.
- Findings are based on a close-election regression-discontinuity research design in Brazil.
