
π Main Argument
Surrender is explained as a contagious collective-action problem: victory in battle depends on soldiers choosing to fight together rather than flee, but each soldierβs willingness to fight hinges on expectations about whether comrades will do the same. Soldiers look to what others did in comparable situations, so mass surrender in one engagement raises the probability of surrender in later battles. When no recent precedent exists, widespread capitulation is unlikely.
π§ Evidence: New Data on Conventional Battles, 1939β2011
π Key Findings
βοΈ Why It Matters
These results deepen understanding of battlefield resolve and reveal how micro-level expectations aggregate into life-or-death outcomes. The findings have broader implications for designing political-military institutions and for strategic decisions to initiate, continue, or terminate wars, since the likelihood of capitulation depends in part on observable precedents rather than only on material capabilities or immediate battlefield conditions.

| Until the Bitter End? The Diffusion of Surrender Across Battles was authored by Todd C. Lehmann and Yuri M. Zhukov. It was published by Cambridge in IO in 2019. |