Why Do Incumbents Target Opposition Areas?

Redistribution theories suggest incumbents target benefits to secure voter support. However, this article shows that durable benefits—which permanently boost incomes—might reduce dependence on incumbents. This paradox creates a new rationale for strategic allocation: balancing the income effect with standard electoral rewards.

Research Context & Data:

Brazil's semi-arid municipalities received state-funded cisterns to combat clientelism.

Administrative data tracks how states allocated these resources across regions.

Key Findings:

• Incumbents prioritize copartisans when local clientelistic mobilization is weak

• In areas with strong opposition mobilization, they favor targeting opposition mayors' districts

Electoral Strategy:

The strategy reveals that parties intentionally weaken voters in opposition areas to reduce overall dependence on political machines—a previously unstudied dynamic.

Real-World Relevance:

This approach demonstrates how clientelism shapes redistribution policies.