This study asks whether renewable terms compromise judicial independence by creating incentives for judges to curry favor with actors who control their reappointment. Using a 2010 reform at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) that made judges’ terms nonrenewable with immediate effect, the author estimates how removing reappointment opportunities changed judges’ voting behavior on cases involving their nominating states. The paper’s contribution is a focused causal test of the reappointment mechanism versus selection explanations for pro-state voting.
Key causal test Exploits a court-level reform Addresses selection versus strategic behavior
Data and methods
The analysis exploits the 2010 change to the ECtHR’s term rules as a plausibly exogenous shock: before 2010 judges could seek reappointment; after 2010 terms became nonrenewable immediately. The author compares judges’ voting patterns on cases involving their nominating state before and after the reform to estimate the effect of removing reappointment opportunities. The abstract frames the design as estimating a causal effect and considers selection effects as an alternative explanation.
Main findings
According to the abstract, removing the possibility of reappointment "significantly reduced judges’ tendency to favor their nominating states." The result is presented as evidence that reappointment incentives contributed to pro-nominating-state voting; the abstract notes selection effects as a competing account that the research addresses.
Additional note
The setting is the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), where one judge sits for each member state and sits ex officio on cases involving that state; the reform therefore directly altered incentives for judges in that institutional context.
