
What the Paper Asks
Why did 37 central banks add China’s renminbi (RMB) to their reserves since 2010 while most central banks held back? Steven Liao and Daniel McDowell ask whether reserve-currency choices reflect economic calculations alone or also signal states’ preferences about the global order—specifically, support for the existing US-led liberal order versus an emerging China-centered alternative.
How the Authors Studied It
The authors compile a new list of 37 central banks that adopted RMB reserves after 2010 and combine that information with United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) ideal-point estimates to capture each state’s foreign-policy alignment relative to the United States and China. Using statistical analysis that accounts for conventional economic controls (such as trade links, financial openness, and transaction needs), they test whether political alignment with or distance from major powers predicts early adoption of RMB reserves.
Key Findings
Why This Matters
The paper reframes currency internationalization as a tool of foreign-policy signaling: reserve choices reveal states’ geopolitical orientations and preferences about international order. These findings matter for scholars of international monetary relations and policymakers monitoring how China’s financial footprint is expanding—not only through markets and institutions, but through symbolic acts embedded in central-bank behavior.

| No Reservations: International Order and Demand for the Renminbi As a Reserve Currency was authored by Steven Liao and Daniel McDowell. It was published by Oxford in ISQ in 2016. |