How U.S. Presidents Use Economic Sanctions to Boost Domestic Approval

Why This Question Matters

Economic sanctions are a common foreign-policy tool, yet scholars and practitioners doubt their effectiveness in changing target behavior. One alternative explanation is that sanctions serve a symbolic domestic function: they allow leaders to signal toughness without committing to costly measures. Taehee Whang tests whether sanctions deliver such domestic political benefits in the United States and why that matters for understanding foreign-policy choices.

What Taehee Whang Did

Whang examines the relationship between episodes of sanctions imposition and U.S. presidential approval ratings. Using statistical models that link sanctions events to contemporaneous shifts in approval—while accounting for other political developments—Whang evaluates whether imposing sanctions corresponds to measurable gains in domestic support for policymakers.

Key Findings

• Imposing economic sanctions is associated with increases in presidential approval ratings, suggesting a direct domestic payoff for policymakers.
• The results are consistent with a symbolic-use interpretation: sanctions can function as a low-cost way to display leadership during international conflicts rather than as primarily instrumental tools to change target behavior.
• These domestic benefits create incentives for leaders to employ sanctions even when their efficacy against targets is ambiguous.

What This Means for Policy and Research

The study reframes sanctions not only as instruments of coercion but also as tools of domestic political signaling. For scholars, the findings highlight the need to consider domestic audience incentives when evaluating why sanctions are chosen and how effective they are. For policymakers and observers, the research cautions that sanctions may be deployed as visible gestures that bolster leaders at home without necessarily advancing foreign-policy objectives.