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Experts Rationalize Authoritarian Rule, But It Backfires

Authoritarian Decision-MakingExpert InfluenceRationalization TheoryGulf MonarchiesComparative PoliticsWorld Pol.4 datasetsDataverse
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This article examines expert advisers in Arab Gulf monarchies through qualitative fieldwork and experiments.

Key Findings:

* Expert advice contributes to ruling elites' overconfidence in state-building shortcuts.

* Expert information reduces public support for reform initiatives.

Data & Methods:

Qualitative interviews combined with three targeted experiments provide compelling evidence.

Experts play a complex role, enabling rationalizations that increase elite confidence but generating unintended negative consequences through a backfire effect.

Article card for article: Adviser to the King: Experts, Rationalization, and Legitimacy
Adviser to the King: Experts, Rationalization, and Legitimacy was authored by Calvert Jones. It was published by Princeton in World Pol. in 2019.
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