Political lotteries once shaped legislatures in 19th-century Europe. This article examines how they influenced party formation.

Context: A unique lottery system assigned budget committee posts in the French Third Republic during 1877-1914, creating a novel selection method based on deputy data.

Key Argument: The authors propose this procedure was intentionally designed to shield early parliamentary institutions from capture by established political factions.

Main Finding: Analysis reveals that partial randomization did favor less experienced but highly qualified young middle-class deputies over entrenched elites, effectively diversifying representation at a critical moment for party development. This 'clever' reform deliberately prioritized youth and skill to counter factional interests.

Shift in Power: When parties consolidated control of committee assignments in 1910 (post-crisis), the selection system returned to favoring political elites.

The Broader Link: The study connects this institutional innovation to party development by showing cohesive parties ultimately led reforms that reversed the lottery's impact, signaling a move towards more conventional elite-dominated representation. This demonstrates how seemingly 'non-political' mechanisms can shape partisan dynamics during transitions.