Lawmakers may delegate authority to federal agencies more under unified government conditions. This study examines how congressional deadlines influence agency rule-making speed from 1995-2014.
Data & Methods
* Congressional mandate timeline data (1995–2014)
* Agency regulatory issuance timing data (1997–2014)
Key Findings
* Statutes passed during unified administrations often include faster statutory deadlines
* Deadlines accelerate agency rule production but don't fully solve the coalitional drift problem
* Oversight mechanisms remain crucial tools for controlling policy direction
Why It Matters
These findings suggest strategic delegation by current lawmakers to secure policy before future elections disrupt alignment. This approach balances efficiency with political control.
| A Race for the Regs: Unified Government, Statutory Deadlines, and Federal Agency Rulemaking was authored by Robert J. Mcgrath and Jason MacDonald. It was published by Wiley in LSQ in 2019. |
