Electoral accountability shapes how legislators respond to constraints, but the impact varies significantly across different institutional contexts.
📍 Data & Methods
- Analyzed three Swiss legislative bodies:
- Federal Council chambers
- Two cantonal parliaments (Basel-Stadt and Basel-Land)
- Traced behavior changes through:
- Novel roll-call vote records
- Speech frequency data
- Used term limit variation as an institutional constraint to measure responsiveness.
🔍 Findings
- Term-limited MPs in cantonal parliaments show no signs of shirking or reduced activity (slacking).
- In contrast, federal legislators demonstrate counterintuitive patterns:
- Some term-limited members engage in increased avoidance behaviors.
- Others reduce their parliamentary workload slightly.
💡 Why It Matters
This study reveals how electoral accountability and institutional design interact to shape legislative behavior across different levels of government. The findings challenge conventional assumptions about the effects of term limits on parliamentarians' conduct.
