A counterintuitive finding suggests that executives pursue unilateral power less under divided government. This article argues that polarization and marginal majorities hinder legislative retaliation against executive actions in a separation of powers system. Using 24,232 US state executive orders from 1993–2013 – the largest analysis to date – we demonstrate how lawmakers can block unilateralism through statutory responses or other nonstatutory tools.
A Surprising Pattern
Executives are less likely to act unilaterally when facing divided government. This contradicts assumptions that polarization leads to more executive power.
The Underlying Mechanism
Legislative capacity becomes crucial during opposition:
- Polarization and marginal majorities weaken legislative ability to retaliate effectively
- Lack of nonstatutory tools (like regulatory review) makes statutory responses even harder
What the Data Shows
Our large-scale analysis reveals a clear pattern: higher polarization with divided government actually constrains, not encourages, executive unilateralism.
These findings highlight how legislative power shapes separation-of-powers dynamics.
