Governments in Germany strategically adjust the pace of their legislative agenda when anticipating future majorities. Fearing loss of control, they accelerate bills; hoping to gain majority support, they delay them. This approach operates differently under symmetric and asymmetric bicameralism.
Key Hypothesis: Governments predict second chamber electoral shifts to guide their own legislative speed.
Our analysis uses a formal model applied to 1967 governmental bills between 1998-2013 in Germany. Findings show this strategy works effectively for symmetric bicameralism, but not necessarily for asymmetric systems.
Real-World Implications: This confirms election cycles profoundly shape legislative timing strategies across different bicameral structures.
| Temporal Strategies: Governments Alter the Pace of Legislation in Bicameralism Depending on Electoral Expectations was authored by Christoph Garwe, Benjamin G. Engst, Yannick G. Stawicki and Christoph Hönnige. It was published by Wiley in LSQ in 2023. |
