This research investigates how political science concepts like clientelism and reciprocity operate within social networks in the Philippines. While canonical models suggest brokers rely on dense networks for monitoring votes, this study finds they often target intrinsically reciprocal voters instead. By combining survey data with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, we demonstrate that brokers actually employ both strategies depending on network conditions.
Our findings show two clear patterns:
First, brokers are selected based on their central position within the social network and their knowledge about voters.
Second, they adapt their targeting approach to local network structures. In dense networks (with many connections), brokers prefer voters with numerous ties because these votes are easier to monitor. Conversely, in sparse networks, brokers focus more on intrinsically reciprocal individuals whose voting behavior requires less active oversight.
These insights help explain the complex dynamics of clientelism and how social structure influences political broker strategies.
| Brokers, Social Networks, Reciprocity, and Clientelism was authored by Nico Ravanilla, Dotan Haim and Allen Hicken. It was published by Wiley in AJPS in 2022. |
