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Does Partisan Misalignment Drive City Lobbying? A New Study Examines Representation Gaps

Partisan LogicCity MobilizationState LobbyingDistricts ElectingAmerican PoliticsAPSR5 R files4 datasetsDataverse
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Local governments hire lobbyists for representation gaps.

BACKGROUND & QUESTION

* Why do localities seek legislative advocacy?

* This paper argues it depends on policy congruence with state representatives.

DATA & METHODOLOGY

Nearly a decade of original panel data from all 50 U.S. states.

Using difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity design.

KEY FINDING

Cities significantly more likely to hire lobbyists when districts elect non-co-partisan representatives.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This evidence supports the idea that local officials purchase advocacy services to bridge multilevel government preference gaps.

Article card for article: The Partisan Logic of City Mobilization: Evidence From State Lobbying Disclosures
The Partisan Logic of City Mobilization: Evidence From State Lobbying Disclosures was authored by Julia Payson. It was published by Cambridge in APSR in 2020.
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