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How Military Strength Prevents War: Credibility and Reciprocity in Alliances

extended deterrenceprobit analysiscredibilityreciprocityInternational Relations@APSR1 datasetDataverse
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Scholars argue that effective deterrence requires a careful balance of military power and diplomatic behavior.

Research Methodology & Data:

* Analysis of fifty-eight historical cases through probit analysis.

* Focuses on conditions for extended vs. immediate deterrence success or failure.

Key Findings:

* Enhanced Deterrence: A defender's battlefield capability to prevent a swift victory strongly enhances deterrence credibility.

* Reciprocity Matters: Diplomatic and military reciprocity significantly contributes to successful deterrence outcomes.

* Past Behavior Predicts Future Outcomes: Defenders' previous records of yielding or being inflexible increase the likelihood of deterrence failure in crises.

Implications:

The study demonstrates that while military readiness builds trust, consistent policy behavior is crucial. A defender's past actions shape how allies (and adversaries) perceive their resolve.

Article card for article: Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War
Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War was authored by Paul Huth. It was published by Cambridge in APSR in 1988.
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American Political Science Review