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Electoral Rules: A Clash of Predictions Between Behavior and Equilibrium

Primary elections' impact on candidate positions remains unclear despite theoretical predictions.

Theoretical Dilemma:

  • Equilibrium Analysis: Standard models predict convergence toward the median voter's position in primaries with complete information.
  • Behavioral Game Theory: This approach anticipates divergence due to policy motivations and out-of-equilibrium beliefs among candidates.

Experimental Findings: Primary Elections & Candidate Positions

  • A controlled, incentivized experiment reveals significant candidate divergence during simulated primary elections.
  • Primaries do not cause substantial movement toward the median voter; average positions remain largely unchanged.

Voter Strategy in Primaries:

  • Voters employ a strategy that eliminates candidates perceived as too moderate or too extreme from the general election field.
  • This behavior enhances ideological purity without increasing overall candidate divergence beyond what behavioral models predict.

Implications for Research:

This analysis underscores the critical need to consider behavioral assumptions when studying electoral institutions, challenging traditional equilibrium-based predictions.

American Political Science Review
Primaries and Candidate Polarization: Behavioral Theory and Experimental Evidence was authored by Jonathan Woon. It was published in APSR in 2018. Find on Google Scholarhttps://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000515
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