Electoral Rules: A Clash of Predictions Between Behavior and Equilibrium

Primary elections' impact on candidate positions remains unclear despite theoretical predictions.

Theoretical Dilemma:

* Equilibrium Analysis: Standard models predict convergence toward the median voter's position in primaries with complete information.

* Behavioral Game Theory: This approach anticipates divergence due to policy motivations and out-of-equilibrium beliefs among candidates.

Experimental Findings: Primary Elections & Candidate Positions

* A controlled, incentivized experiment reveals significant candidate divergence during simulated primary elections.

* Primaries do not cause substantial movement toward the median voter; average positions remain largely unchanged.

Voter Strategy in Primaries:

* Voters employ a strategy that eliminates candidates perceived as too moderate or too extreme from the general election field.

* This behavior enhances ideological purity without increasing overall candidate divergence beyond what behavioral models predict.

Implications for Research:

This analysis underscores the critical need to consider behavioral assumptions when studying electoral institutions, challenging traditional equilibrium-based predictions.