Introduction
This study investigates how autocracies manage collective action through representation, using data from Imperial Russia.
Data & Methods
Researchers analyze peasant representation in local self-government institutions against historical records of peasant unrest preceding major reforms.
They address potential measurement errors and endogeneity issues by focusing on two unique determinants: the length of serfdom history and levels of religious polarization within districts.
Key Findings
* Peasant representation was lower in areas with higher prior unrest frequency.
* This pattern aligns with Acemoglu & Robinson's model predicting minimal concessions during instability, contrary to established political transition theory.
* Subsequent redistribution patterns deviate from the expected commitment mechanism central to that model.
Significance
These results challenge conventional wisdom about autocratic institutional change and suggest important nuances in how power dynamics influence reforms.
| Collective Action and Representation in Autocracies: Evidence from Russia's Great Reforms was authored by Paul Castañeda Dower, Evgeny Finkel, Scott Gehlbach and Steven Nafziger. It was published by Cambridge in APSR in 2018. |
