New theory explains presidential use of executive orders. It argues that divided government and ideological differences matter less when a capable Congress can constrain the president.
We show that legislative capacity has changed over time – low before mid-1940s, high afterwards.
Findings:
Presidents issue more orders during divided governments when* Congress lacks capacity (pre-mid 1940s).
* In later periods with strong Congressional capacity, ideological divides and divided government have less impact on unilateralism.
Data & Methods:
Basing our analysis on institutional changes between 1905-2013. We used regression discontinuity design to test how legislative capacity thresholds affect presidential action.
This work deepens understanding of separation-of-powers politics and executive power limits.
| Legislative Capacity and Executive Unilateralism was authored by Alexander Bolton and Sharece Thrower. It was published by Wiley in AJPS in 2016. |
