Terrorism, though often ineffective at securing immediate concessions from violent organizations, may enhance their prospects in civil war contexts. New monthly data on African conflicts reveals a counterintuitive finding: rebel groups involved in more terror attacks are significantly more likely to be granted negotiation opportunities and offered concessions later. This study shifts focus beyond mere concession acquisition to examine broader success indicators.
📊 Data & Methods
* Leverages newly compiled monthly datasets tracking negotiations and concessions across African civil wars
* Employs statistical analyses on granular, temporal data rather than aggregated measures
🔍 Key Findings
* Increased terror attack incidence correlates with higher likelihood of rebel group participation in peace negotiations
* Groups experiencing more terrorism subsequently receive a greater number of concessions during bargaining processes
💡 Why It Matters
* Challenges the oversimplified view that terrorism always fails politically by demonstrating its potential impact on broader negotiation outcomes
* Provides nuanced understanding for policymakers and scholars regarding rebel tactics and government responses in African conflict zones
| Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War was authored by Jakana L. Thomas. It was published by Wiley in AJPS in 2014. |
