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Insights from the Field

Vote Buying Enforcement Requires Small-Scale Monitoring for Compliance


collective monitoring
vote buying
Colombia
regression discontinuity
Latin American Politics
AJPS
1 PDF files
5 archives
2 text files
Dataverse
Small Aggregates, Big Manipulation: Vote Buying Enforcement and Collective Monitoring was authored by Miguel Rueda. It was published by Wiley in AJPS in 2017.

Vote buying persists despite democratic safeguards. This article explains why: brokers enforce deals through published results only when monitoring small voter groups is feasible.

Key Finding: Brokers target compliance in small voting blocs to sustain vote-buying networks.

Evidence from Colombia shows a clear negative correlation between polling station size and reported manipulation.

A robust relationship exists: Smaller stations facilitate broker enforcement via collective monitoring, as demonstrated through various identification techniques including regression discontinuity designs.

Why It Matters: This finding highlights how democratic institutions can be undermined by seemingly unrelated features of electoral systems.

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