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Why Do Industries Fund Campaigns Despite Roll-Call Vote Gains?

Campaign FinanceCommittee ChairsContribution LimitsAccess PoliticsAmerican Politics@AJPS2 Stata filesDataverse
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This study investigates why corporations donate to legislative campaigns despite seemingly gaining nothing from roll-call votes.

Key Argument:

Corporate donors strategically shape policy by influencing agenda-setters early in lawmaking, particularly committee and party leaders.

Data & Methods:

New dataset: 45,000+ individual state legislator sessions (1988-2012).

Using a difference-in-differences design to measure the value of access through campaign contributions.

Findings:

* Industries systematically target specific agenda-setters who regulate them and possess procedural power.

* The perceived value of agenda-setter positions has significantly increased in recent years.

* Changes in state contribution limits disproportionately benefit committee chairs and party leaders, suggesting they strategically obstruct such reforms.

This research underscores the strategic role of access politics in policy outcomes.

Article card for article: When Are Agenda Setters Valuable?
When Are Agenda Setters Valuable? was authored by Alexander Fouirnaies. It was published by Wiley in AJPS in 2018.
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American Journal of Political Science