### Introduction
Worker remittances represent the second largest international financial flow source in developing countries. This paper examines their impact on nondemocratic politics by analyzing how these funds influence antigovernment protest behavior.
### Key Findings
Contrary to recent research suggesting remittances contribute to authoritarian stability, we argue they actually increase political dissent through several mechanisms:
* Resource Augmentation: Remittances provide potential opponents with more financial resources for organizing activities.
Strategic Targeting: Funds appear particularly effective in fueling protest in opposition areas*, rather than progovernment regions.
### Methodological Approach
Our analysis challenges the existing literature by utilizing mixed-level evidence:
1. Cross-national data on a latent measure of antigovernment political protest reveals remittances increase overall dissent.
2. Individual-level survey data from eight African nondemocracies demonstrates remittance recipients are more likely to engage in protest compared to their peers without such financial inflows.
### Political Implications
These findings highlight the complex relationship between economic flows and authoritarian governance, suggesting foreign capital under certain conditions can strengthen opposition movements despite bolstering state finances. This nuanced understanding potentially reshapes how political scientists view external financial relationships in nondemocratic contexts.
| Remittances and Protest in Dictatorships was authored by Abel Escribà‐Folch, Covadonga Meseguer and Joseph Wright. It was published by Wiley in AJPS in 2018. |
