Fed governments now use empirical measures to push policy goals down to local areas—what we call performance federalism. We argue this approach distorts democratic accountability in lower-level elections.
Study Context:
This research analyzes voter behavior during school tax referenda in the U.S., where a state provided a widely publicized indicator of district performance.
We show voters cannot reliably infer educational quality from these indicators, leading to unintended consequences. A federal signal indicating poor district outcomes actually increases failure rates for needed tax levies—a surprisingly robust effect that hits hardest in poorer communities.
Findings:
• Voter decisions appear influenced by misleading federal information • Poorer districts face significantly higher levy failure risks with negative signals • The effect holds across multiple identification strategies and mechanism tests • This indicates voters may lack the tools to properly evaluate performance data
These results suggest policy interventions using external metrics risk undermining local democratic decision-making processes.
| Performance Federalism and Local Democracy: Theory and Evidence from School Tax Referenda was authored by Vladimir Kogan, Stéphane Lavertu and Zachary Peskowitz. It was published by Wiley in AJPS in 2016. |
