FIND DATA: By Journal | Sites   ANALYZE DATA: Help with R | SPSS | Stata | Excel   WHAT'S NEW? US Politics | IR | Law & Courts🎵
   FIND DATA: By Journal | Sites   WHAT'S NEW? US Politics | IR | Law & Courts🎵
WHAT'S NEW? US Politics | IR | Law & Courts🎵
If this link is broken, please report as broken. You can also submit updates (will be reviewed).

How New Constitutions Boost Liberal Democracy: Elite Bargains vs. Direct Populism

Comparative Politics subfield banner

This paper challenges the traditional democratic theory that only constitutions created through direct popular involvement truly solidify democracy.

Alternative Path to Democracy: We argue instead that plural elite agreements are more effective at establishing liberal democracy globally between 1900-2015.︎ Power dispersion during negotiations leads these elites to adopt protective institutions without undermining majority rule.

Short-Term vs. Long-Term Effects: The study finds democratizing effects of such political bargains initially stronger when power balances remain stable—but risks diminish over time as the original agreement's terms weaken.

Methodology & Evidence: Using an original global dataset and a difference-in-differences design, this research demonstrates that elite-led constitution-writing processes better institutionalize liberal democratic protections than direct popular involvement.

Article card for article: Constitutional Origins and Liberal Democracy: A Global Analysis, 1900-2015
Constitutional Origins and Liberal Democracy: A Global Analysis, 1900-2015 was authored by Gabriel L. Negretto and Mariano Sanchez-Talanquer. It was published by Cambridge in APSR in 2021.
Find on Google Scholar
Find on JSTOR
Find on CUP
American Political Science Review
Edit article record marker