Central governments often face compliance challenges when relying on local authorities, especially in authoritarian systems where citizens aren't directly involved in elections. This study presents a national-scale field experiment conducted in China to examine how public, non-governmental ratings of municipal governments' adherence to central directives—specifically regarding pollution information disclosure—affect compliance levels.
Research Design & Context:
• A randomized experiment involving Chinese municipalities
• Central mandates focused on increasing transparency about pollution management
• Non-governmental monitoring aimed at reducing implementation gaps between Beijing and local authorities
Key Findings:
• Treatment effects show a significant increase in compliance rates after just one year
• Positive reinforcement effect persists even into the second post-treatment year
• Public ratings effectively lower monitoring costs for central governments without necessarily increasing public awareness or media focus on environmental issues
Implications & Takeaways:
This research demonstrates that nonstate actors can significantly enhance governance mechanisms in authoritarian contexts. The findings suggest strategic opportunities for improving compliance systems through carefully designed NGO-government partnerships, offering practical insights for policymakers seeking to strengthen implementation processes.
| Non-Governmental Monitoring of Local Governments Increases Compliance with Central Mandates: A National-Scale Field Experiment in China was authored by Sarah Anderson, Mark Buntaine, Mengdi Liu and Bing Zhang. It was published by Wiley in AJPS in 2019. |
