Coalition governments are common across parliamentary democracies, yet it remains unclear which parties' policy promises actually translate into government action. This study addresses a key theoretical puzzle: how does institutional context shape outcomes in multiparty coalitions?
New theories suggest that when legislative institutions credibly enforce agreements among coalition partners, policies should reflect compromise from all parties involved. In systems lacking such enforcement mechanisms, however, the preferences of ministry-controlling parties likely dominate.
To test this conditional relationship directly for the first time, we analyzed 15 parliamentary democracies focusing on changes in social protection policies. Our findings clearly demonstrate that stronger legislative institutions significantly influence which coalition partners get their policy demands incorporated into government action.
Data & Methods: Comparative analysis of policy outcomes across 15 countries over multiple election cycles
Key Findings: Enforcement capacity shapes the relative policy influence of coalition parties
Why It Matters: Results offer new insights on bargaining dynamics within parliamentary systems and inform theories about democratic governance under multiparty coalitions.
This work reframes our understanding of coalition durability, legislative bargaining power, and how electoral promises translate into actual government policies.
| Coalition Government, Legislative Institutions, and Public Policy in Parliamentary Democracies was authored by Lanny Martin and Georg Vanberg. It was published by Wiley in AJPS in 2020. |
