When cooperation is subjective, mutual uncertainty actually encourages honest behavior and reliable signaling between actors.
➡️ What's New
This study presents a formal model showing how incomplete information about each other's preferences can incentivize truthfulness in diplomatic interactions.
➡️ How It Works
Senders genuinely uncertain whether their actions will be perceived as cooperative have less incentive to misrepresent intentions and more reason to pursue authentic goals. Credible signals then emerge naturally from this mutual uncertainty.
➡️ Why This Matters
This finding challenges conventional assumptions about incomplete information in bargaining models, offering new insights into international relations during periods of strategic ambiguity.
Using the Sino-Soviet split as a historical example and connecting to contemporary U.S.-China relations, the research demonstrates how this mechanism might explain successful diplomatic outcomes despite persistent uncertainties. Keywords: Subjective Cooperation, Honest Signaling, Uncertainty Management, Cold War Diplomacy, International Negotiations
