This paper asks how bilateral investment treaties (BITs) affect women's rights in host states, arguing that BITs produce divergent effects across types of rights. The authors propose that an initial “locking in” to attract investors and later legal pressures on states reduce enforcement against foreign investors, which they link to declines in women’s economic rights. They further argue that host states may respond to unrest or backlash by improving women’s political rights as a compensatory measure. The paper reports that the authors’ expectations are "broadly and consistently confirmed."
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) Negative effect on women’s economic rights Improvement in women’s political rights
Data and methods
The abstract sets out a theoretical argument linking BITs to a sequence of state behavior—pre-signing policy changes to attract partners, reluctance to prosecute investors because of arbitration threats, and subsequent political concessions. The authors report that they test these assertions empirically, but the abstract does not specify the empirical design, data sources, or measurements used.
Main findings
According to the abstract, the study finds divergent effects of BITs on women’s rights: a negative impact on women’s economic rights associated with the proposed "locking in" and investor-protection dynamics, and a compensatory improvement in women’s political rights. The abstract summarizes these results as broadly and consistently confirming the authors’ expectations.
- Negative effect on women’s economic rights following BIT-related policy and enforcement changes.
- Subsequent improvements in women’s political rights interpreted as a compensatory response by host states.
