This article asks how foreign state communications affect public attitudes about a concrete policy: whether China should be permitted to invest in nuclear power infrastructure in the United Kingdom. Using messaging derived from official Chinese news articles, the authors deploy a survey experiment to test whether publics respond differently to coercive versus persuasive signals, how perceptions of threat or economic dependence matter, and whether counter-coercion by close allies moderates effects. The contribution is an experimental test of strategic communication from a foreign state on a specific energy-investment policy question, with attention to conditional factors that might reduce or reverse messaging effects.
Data and methods
The study uses a survey experiment that presents respondents with arguments drawn from Chinese official news coverage and varies whether messages are coercive or persuasive. The abstract reports that the design measures perceptions of security threat and economic dependence and tests moderation by counter-coercion from allies. The sample frame, sample size, and exact questionnaire items are not described in the supplied abstract.
Main findings
According to the abstract, security-threat perceptions substantially limit the effectiveness of strategic messaging: even mild persuasive appeals can backfire, shifting public opinion away from the foreign state's position. The authors also examine whether economic dependence and allied counter-coercion alter responses, though the abstract highlights threat perceptions as the key impediment.
Survey experiment Security-threat moderation Policy-specific public opinion
- Messages were derived from official Chinese news articles and experimentally varied between coercion and persuasion.
- Perceptions of security threat produced a backlash effect, with persuasion sometimes moving opinion against China.
