This study asks why some rebel winners succeed in creating obedient, state-like militaries after civil war while others experience postwar military defections. Using a new list of winning rebel groups since 1946 and two case studies (Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire), the author argues that intense security threats during the civil war make field commanders more likely to remain obedient by promoting inclusive leadership and by constraining commanders’ capacity to build local power bases during the war-to-peace transition.
New list of winning rebel groups, focus on security threat intensity, case studies: Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire
Data and methods
The analysis draws on a newly compiled list of winning rebel groups since 1946 and probes causal mechanisms with two in-depth case studies. The abstract emphasizes measures of wartime security-threat intensity, leadership inclusiveness, and indicators of commanders’ capacity to develop local ties, but does not report specific statistical models or variables in the abstract itself.
Main findings
According to the abstract, higher wartime security threats are associated with greater postwar obedience among field commanders. The proposed mechanisms are (1) threat-driven incentives for more inclusive leadership structures that reduce commanders’ incentives to defect, and (2) operational constraints that keep insurgents mobile and reduce opportunities for commanders to form independent local support bases. The abstract frames these as plausible mechanisms tested with the new list and the two case studies rather than as definitive causal proof.
Contribution
The study situates its argument within debates on the consequences of military victory, postwar armed-group trajectories, and conditions for civil–military cohesion in fragile states. It emphasizes theory-building supported by cross-national coding of winners plus detailed historical cases, while retaining qualifications about mechanism testing in the abstract.
