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(will be reviewed).

Automation can make nuclear threats seem more credible, per survey experiments

This paper asks whether nuclear weapons are useful for coercion and whether automating nuclear launch systems changes the credibility and effectiveness of nuclear threats. The authors develop a theoretical argument that reducing human control—by delegating launch authority to automated systems—can strengthen leaders' ability to tie their hands and signal resolve, even while increasing the risk of nuclear war. They test these expectations using preregistered survey experiments with an elite sample of United Kingdom Members of Parliament and two public samples of UK citizens in a hypothetical crisis involving a Russian invasion of Estonia.

Preregistered survey experiments Elite and public UK samples Automated launch vs. non-automated threats

Data and methods

The study uses preregistered survey experiments reported in the abstract. Samples include an elite group of UK Members of Parliament and two public samples of UK citizens. Respondents evaluated a hypothetical crisis scenario (a Russian invasion of Estonia) in which leaders issue nuclear threats implemented either via automated launch systems or non-automated means. The authors compare responses across conditions to assess perceived credibility and behavioral willingness to back down.

Main findings

According to the abstract, the experimental results support the theoretical expectation: automated nuclear threats were associated with greater perceived credibility and increased willingness to back down in the crisis scenario. The authors emphasize that strengthening credibility through automation comes with substantially greater risk of nuclear war.

  • Evidence comes from preregistered survey experiments with both elites (UK MPs) and public samples in the United Kingdom.
  • Automated implementation of nuclear threats increased perceived credibility and respondents' willingness to yield in the presented scenario.

The paper frames these results as a caution: while automation may make coercive threats appear more credible, adopting automated nuclear systems poses severe risks and has important implications for coercive bargaining, weapons-of-mass-destruction policy, and emerging-technology governance.

International Organizations
Delegating Destruction: Coercive Threats and Automated Nuclear Systems was authored by Joshua A. Schwartz and Michael C. Horowitz. It was published in IO in 2026. Find on Google Scholar10.1017/s0020818325101215
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