This paper asks why legislators in parliamentary systems use scarce opportunities to introduce members’ bills and parliamentary motions, despite low success rates. Using a thirty-year record from Iceland, the authors argue that party incentives help explain differences in behavior between government and opposition MPs: parties shape whether MPs stay out of the government’s way or press alternative agendas. The study also reports some evidence that individual MPs’ career concerns play a role alongside party incentives.
party incentives government vs. opposition behavior Iceland, 30-year record
Data and methods
The authors examine members’ bills and parliamentary motions in Iceland over a thirty-year period. The abstract indicates an observational analysis of these legislative proposals to assess patterns of activity across government and opposition MPs; explicit analytic techniques are not detailed in the abstract.
Main findings
The patterns observed are consistent with parties shaping MPs’ legislative activity: government MPs tend to avoid competing with the government agenda or focus on less salient issues, while opposition MPs are more likely to use bills and motions to present alternatives. The authors also report some evidence that MPs’ career concerns influence their behavior, alongside the party-driven incentives.
- Legislative activity differs systematically by whether MPs belong to government or opposition parties.
- There is additional, more limited evidence linking MPs’ career concerns to legislative activity.

