This study compares how leaders build winning coalitions in small versus large groups.
Experimental Setup: Participants led inter-group games and distributed winnings within their own group before seeking re-election.
Key Findings:
- Leaders in large groups heavily utilized public goods for coalition building.
- Leaders in small groups prioritized targeted, private distributions to specific citizens.
- Crucially, supporters of small coalitions received more private benefits long-term compared to non-supporters. In contrast, support for large coalitions offered no future advantages.
Implications:
These results demonstrate that leaders in systems with smaller winning coalitions strategically reward individuals exclusively to maintain power and loyalty over time. This targeted approach creates lasting bonds unachievable through broad public distributions. Conversely, the study highlights how reliance on distributing public goods hinders long-term consolidation of power for large coalition systems.
Methodology & Context:
- Method: Laboratory experiment testing different coalition formation rules.
- Comparison Groups: Leaders managing small vs large winning coalitions.
- Game Scenario: Inter-group competition with subsequent prize distribution.
