This study asks why so few military regimes pursue nuclear weapons, arguing that domestic priorities within militaries and the need to manage internal political threats make such regimes more likely to invest in conventional forces. Using case evidence from Egypt, Brazil, and Pakistan, the author identifies two domestic sources shaping proliferation behavior: the military organization’s resource distribution preferences and regime survival concerns. The paper tests this argument with comparative case analysis and suggests domestic factors matter alongside external security conditions.
Military regimes as case focus Domestic resource preferences Regime survival and internal conflict
Data and methods
The article reports comparative case evidence drawn from three countries—Egypt, Brazil, and Pakistan—to evaluate a theory about military regimes’ force-preference decisions. The author frames two domestic mechanisms (military resource preferences; managing domestic conflicts that threaten survival) as the key explanatory variables and compares them across the selected cases.
Main findings
The analysis concludes that military regimes governing nonnuclear states tend to favor conventional forces over nuclear programs, even when external threats exist, and attributes this pattern to the two domestic mechanisms under study. The abstract emphasizes that external conditions remain important but that domestic factors also have a significant impact on state security behavior.
- Cases analyzed: Egypt; Brazil; Pakistan.
- Core mechanisms: military organization resource priorities; domestic conflict management for regime survival.
