Trade protection policies disproportionately benefit certain declining U.S. industries despite no active lobbying efforts.
This study reveals that political parties strategically allocate these benefits based on electoral competition levels at the district level during the 1990s.
Key findings demonstrate a clear pattern: industries concentrated in politically competitive areas receive higher tariffs and protection, with their comparative disadvantage significantly amplified by local electoral dynamics.
Data & Methods:
* Data on U.S. trade protection measures was combined with subnational employment statistics for specific US industries during the 1990s.
* Analysis used district-level election outcome data from this period.
Findings:
* Trade barriers disproportionately benefit industries in competitive districts, irrespective of lobbying activity.
* The effect is magnified when these protected industries face a comparative disadvantage relative to their peers.
* These results align with theories suggesting parties strategically distribute economic benefits based on electoral geography.
| Party Competition and the Inter-Industry Structure of U.S. Trade Protection was authored by Su-Hyun Lee. It was published by Cambridge in PSR&M in 2017. |
