This article asks whether the presence of a country's nationals in major IMF shareholder states affects the terms that the International Monetary Fund offers that country. The authors propose that large diasporas in powerful creditor countries create migration pressures that lead those shareholders to push the IMF toward loan packages that reduce short-term adjustment costs for borrowers. The paper analyzes IMF programs from 1978 to 2014 to evaluate whether borrowers with larger diasporas in major shareholder states receive different disbursement sizes or conditionality.
Key measurement: diaspora size in major shareholder states Unit of analysis: IMF loan programs (1978–2014) Outcome focus: loan disbursements and number of conditions
Data and methods
The authors analyze all IMF programs between 1978 and 2014. The abstract presents a cross-program empirical assessment that links variation in borrower diasporas in major IMF shareholder countries to subsequent IMF loan terms. The abstract does not detail the exact statistical models or control variables used.
Main findings
According to the abstract, the authors find that borrowers with larger diasporas in major IMF shareholder countries tend to receive larger loan disbursements and face fewer conditions when migration pressures on the G5 countries increase. The abstract frames this as evidence consistent with major shareholders pressing the IMF to limit short-term adjustment costs in countries that send migrants to them.
- Larger diasporas in major shareholder states are associated with larger disbursements (per the abstract).
- Larger diasporas are also associated with fewer conditions attached to IMF loans (per the abstract).
