Why 78 Days of NATO Bombing Pushed Milošević to Concede

🛩️ What This Study Asks

The prominence of air power as a foreign policy tool is clear, but how does the physical act of dropping munitions translate into diplomatic bargaining outcomes? The 1999 NATO bombing campaign over Kosovo is used to link the military process of air strikes to the diplomatic negotiations between the attacker and the adversary, asking why 78 days of bombing were necessary to produce concessions from Milošević.

🔎 How the Case Is Used to Isolate Air Power

The Kosovo campaign provides a setting to isolate the influence of air power on interstate bargaining. The analysis compares expectations from two frameworks:

• Bargaining models (which emphasize incentives, information, and signaling)
• Traditional coercive models (which emphasize punishment and compellence)

The study evaluates observed Serbian government behavior against the contrasting predictions of these models.

📊 What Was Measured

Key observable factors examined as predictors of Serbian behavior include:

• Intensity of bombing
• Duration of bombing (the 78-day campaign)
• Mediation efforts during the crisis

These variables are assessed in relation to concessions and shifts in the adversary's stance during the Kosovo crisis.

📈 Key Findings

• Intensity of the bombing campaign, the overall duration of strikes, and mediation efforts emerged as important predictors of the Serbian government's behavior during the Kosovo crisis.
• Comparing the two theoretical expectations shows that both coercive pressure (through intensity and duration) and diplomatic dynamics (mediation) mattered for producing concessions.

❗ Why It Matters

The findings clarify the link between the military mechanics of air campaigns and the diplomatic bargaining process they are meant to influence. This sheds light on when and how air power can function as an effective tool of coercive diplomacy and informs debates about the design and expected effects of air campaigns in international crises.