Decree Power in Parliamentary Systems
This article investigates the use of decree power by elected governments in parliamentary systems, focusing on India as a case study. Contrary to theoretical expectations that legislative authority would prevent such moves, empirical evidence reveals frequent instances where Indian prime ministers bypass traditional legislative processes.
Why do Indian prime ministers issue ordinances so regularly despite their constitutional constraints? The article argues these discretionary instruments are strategically deployed during election years.
Our analysis demonstrates that ordinances increase significantly before elections, particularly for parties with weak legislative majorities. This pattern suggests governments use decree-making as a strategic vote-buying tool to maintain authority and manage policy initiatives.
We analyzed all post-independence Indian ordinances from 1947-2016 using digital corpus analysis combined with elite interviews across parties, civil society groups, and bureaucratic agencies. This mixed-method approach provides unprecedented insights into the phenomenon over time.
Decree power fundamentally reconfigures accountability in India's parliamentary democracy. The findings offer a novel explanation for democratic backsliding through seemingly legalistic means—electoral timing shapes legislative-executive relations, even when formal rules appear to constrain them.
| Decree Power in Parliamentary Systems: Theory and Evidence from India was authored by Madhav Aney and hubhankar Dam. It was published by Chicago in JOP in 2021. |
