For decades, scholars have studied the adoption of neoliberal financial policies but neglected whether these reforms translate into actual liberalizing outcomes.
This article addresses a critical gap in political economy research: while many countries formally adopt financial sector deregulations (de jure), implementation often proves elusive unless democratic societies are content with their government's commitment to follow through.
We demonstrate that when citizens broadly distrust or oppose government, leaders may announce reforms they don't intend to implement — fearing backlash from powerful opposition groups or simply lacking the political will. Our analysis of financial reform implementation across 90 nations confirms this democratic double-bind exists significantly.
Nine illustrative case studies highlight these dynamics during periods ranging from 1980-2005, showing that de facto liberalization requires more than formal adoption — it demands either public satisfaction with government or the political capacity to push through reforms despite pressure.
| The Political Economy of Financial Reform: De Jure Liberalization Vs. De Facto Implementation was authored by Witold J. Henisz and Edward Mansfield. It was published by Oxford in ISQ in 2019. |
