This paper reveals a counterintuitive finding: political competition can reduce local public goods provision by undermining legislative bargaining efficiency. Using panel data from Mali, the authors demonstrate that increased competition leads to lower spending on public services despite its traditional role in incentivizing incumbents.
The mechanism behind this negative effect involves inefficiencies in bargaining processes rather than electoral benefits alone. This relationship appears stronger in contexts with weak party systems and low institutional transparency—characteristics common in young democracies.
To test generalizability, the study analyzes cross-country data showing that competition yields worse outcomes under low levels of party system institutionalization. Conversely, higher institutionalization buffers this detrimental effect.
These findings challenge simplistic views of political competition's benefits. They highlight a critical tension where electoral dynamics may simultaneously weaken governance capacity in certain environments.
This nuanced perspective underscores the need for scholars to consider both electoral incentives and legislative mechanisms when evaluating public policy implications.
