Why It Matters: This study investigates how seemingly positive state-building efforts during colonial rule in Mexico could paradoxically lead to rebellion. Key Findings: We discovered that centralizing tax collection by reducing reliance on local elites inadvertently weakened their incentive to suppress popular unrest, making rebellion more likely even when grievances were not universal. Data & Methods: Our analysis uses subnational data on rebellion incidence (1680-1821), tax centralization levels, and drought frequency from colonial Mexico.
Specifically, we examine the period from the late seventeenth century to the Mexican War of Independence (roughly 1680-1821). During this time, Spanish authorities pushed for greater state control by implementing reforms aimed at increasing direct taxation. These reforms often bypassed local elites who previously collected taxes and enforced order in their territories.
The central argument is that these centralized fiscal policies created a conflict between the colonial administration's interests and those of the local elites (gachupines vs. peninsulares, and Spanish vs. Criollo elites). By diminishing the role and influence of intermediaries, centralization reforms reduced their motivation to maintain order for their own benefit.
We illustrate this mechanism by analyzing how rebellion spread during localized crises when centralized tax demands increased pressure on specific elites, who were then less willing or able to repress popular mobilizations. The presence of drought data allows us to test if commoner hardship (data & methods) acted as a catalyst amplifying the effects of elite disengagement.
