Why Don’t Ruling Parties Create Permanent Legislative Majorities Through Redistricting?

Every decade, after the census, state legislatures across America engage in the ultimate exercise of political power: redrawing electoral districts. In most states, the party controlling the legislature and governor’s mansion enjoys what appears to be the perfect opportunity to cement their political dominance for the next decade. They possess detailed voter data, sophisticated mapping software, and—crucially—the legal authority to draw districts however they choose, with political gerrymandering being generally permissible under current law.

This raises a fundamental puzzle in political science: Why don’t ruling parties simply create permanent legislative majorities through redistricting? The theoretical framework exists, the tools are available, and the legal barriers are minimal. Yet despite some notable examples of aggressive gerrymandering, most states don’t see the complete electoral entrenchment that theory would predict.

The Theoretical Possibility

The strategy for maintaining permanent legislative majority through partisan gerrymandering is relatively simple. A ruling party with unified control of state government could theoretically guarantee its continued dominance by strategically concentrating opposition voters into a few districts while spreading their own supporters across the remaining districts with comfortable but not overwhelming majorities. This classic “pack and crack” strategy would maximize the number of safe seats for the majority party while minimizing competitive districts.

King and Gelman’s influential work in the American Political Science Review cites theoretical research demonstrating that it should be mathematically possible for a majority party to guarantee its continuation through strategic redistricting. The party would need to solve a relatively straightforward optimization problem: given known voter preferences and geographic constraints, how should districts be drawn to maximize the number of safe seats?

Modern technology has made this optimization increasingly feasible. Parties now have access to precinct-level voting data, demographic information, and sophisticated mapping software that can test thousands of possible district configurations. We have a remarkably good idea of what percentage of voters in any given area will vote for which party before they even go to the polls.

Moreover, the legal framework seems to permit such strategies. Political affiliation is not a protected class under federal law, and political gerrymandering has traditionally been considered an acceptable—if unsavory—practice. The Supreme Court has generally declined to intervene in political gerrymandering cases, leaving states free to draw districts based on partisan considerations.

The Collective Action Challenge

Despite these theoretical advantages, the reality of redistricting involves significant collective action problems that may prevent optimal outcomes for the majority party. The collectively best strategy for the ruling party might require individual legislators to accept reduced electoral security for the collective good. Some legislators may be asked to give up safe districts or accept new constituencies to maximize overall party advantage.

This creates a classic prisoner’s dilemma scenario. Each legislator has an incentive to demand a safe district for themselves while hoping others will accept the electoral risk necessary to maximize overall party gains. The legislator who agrees to a more competitive district is taking a personal risk for a collective benefit, while those who insist on safe districts are free-riding on others’ sacrifices.

The question becomes: Is there a way to enforce a collective agreement among majority party legislators? While parties can meet in caucus privately to hammer out agreements, the enforcement mechanisms are limited. Unlike party discipline in parliamentary systems, American legislators ultimately answer to their individual constituencies, not party leadership. A legislator who breaks ranks on redistricting may face party sanctions, but they retain their seat and their independent political base.

The Information and Uncertainty Problem

Even with sophisticated data and mapping technology, significant uncertainties remain that may prevent parties from achieving permanent majorities. Voter preferences are not static, and the American electorate is remarkably mobile. An area that votes solidly Republican or Democratic at one point in time may change dramatically over a ten-year period due to demographic shifts, economic changes, or generational replacement.

Consider the rapid political transformation of suburban districts in states like Virginia, Georgia, and Texas over the past decade. Districts that were reliably Republican in 2010 became competitive or even Democratic by 2020, not because of redistricting, but because of changing voter preferences and population mobility. A party that designs districts based on current voter patterns may find those patterns obsolete by mid-decade.

The information problem is compounded by the fact that political preferences themselves may be endogenous to district design. If a party creates a district that is intended to be safely Republican with a 60-40 partisan advantage, but includes a diverse mix of suburban and rural voters, the resulting political dynamics and candidate selection may not match the party’s expectations.

Strategic Adaptation by the Opposition

The out-of-power party is not passive in the face of gerrymandering. Opposition parties can adapt their platforms, candidate selection, and campaign strategies in response to new district configurations. If the majority party creates districts with narrow but reliable partisan advantages, the opposition has strong incentives to moderate their positions or recruit candidates who can appeal to swing voters.

This strategic adaptation creates a dynamic game between the parties. The majority party draws districts based on current voter preferences and party positions, but the minority party can respond by shifting their platform or recruiting different types of candidates. A district designed to be safely Republican based on 2020 voting patterns might become competitive if the Democratic Party moderates its position on key issues or recruits a particularly appealing candidate.

The minority party also has incentives to invest heavily in voter registration and mobilization in districts where they were “cracked” by the majority party. If the majority party spreads opposition voters across multiple districts to dilute their influence, the minority party can focus their resources on turning out those voters and potentially flip multiple districts simultaneously.

The Fractionalization Problem

As majority parties become more successful at redistricting, they may face internal fractionalization that undermines their collective advantage. A party that controls 70% of legislative seats rather than 55% may find it more difficult to maintain internal discipline and unity. Legislators in safe districts may feel freer to pursue their own agendas or challenge party leadership.

This fractionalization can manifest in several ways. First, legislators in ultra-safe districts may move toward more extreme positions to appeal to their base, making the party as a whole less appealing to swing voters. Second, power-hungry legislators may challenge each other for leadership positions, creating internal conflicts that weaken the party’s overall effectiveness. Third, the party may struggle to maintain message discipline when legislators don’t fear general election challenges.

The irony is that successful gerrymandering may create the conditions for the majority party’s eventual downfall. By eliminating competitive general elections, gerrymandering increases the importance of primary elections, which tend to reward more ideologically extreme candidates. This can push the party toward positions that are less popular with the general electorate, making them vulnerable when political conditions change.

Legal and Institutional Constraints

While political gerrymandering is generally permissible, states do face some legal and institutional constraints that may prevent the most extreme forms of redistricting. Many states have constitutional or statutory requirements for district contiguity, compactness, and respect for existing political boundaries. These requirements may limit the most aggressive gerrymandering strategies.

Additionally, the Voting Rights Act continues to constrain redistricting in states with significant minority populations. The requirement to create majority-minority districts where possible can complicate partisan gerrymandering strategies, as parties must balance partisan advantage with compliance with federal voting rights law.

Some states have also adopted independent redistricting commissions or other reform measures that remove or limit partisan control over the process. While these reforms are not universal, they represent institutional constraints on partisan gerrymandering that may prevent the most extreme outcomes.

Empirical Evidence: The Cases of Wisconsin and North Carolina

Wisconsin and North Carolina provide instructive examples of states where ruling parties have made aggressive attempts to create permanent majorities through redistricting, with mixed results. In Wisconsin, Republicans used sophisticated mapping software after the 2010 census to create a redistricting plan that maximized their legislative advantage. The plan was remarkably successful in the short term, allowing Republicans to maintain large legislative majorities even when they lost the statewide popular vote.

However, the Wisconsin case also illustrates the limitations of redistricting as a tool for permanent majority control. The plan faced sustained legal challenges, generated significant public backlash, and may have contributed to the party’s declining performance in statewide elections. Moreover, changing voter preferences and the party’s strategic responses began to erode the plan’s effectiveness over time.

North Carolina presents a similar pattern. Republicans’ aggressive redistricting after 2010 initially secured large legislative majorities, but the plan faced legal challenges, public opposition, and eventual court-ordered revisions. The party’s emphasis on redistricting may have distracted from other aspects of governance and contributed to electoral losses in other areas.

The Limits of Electoral Engineering

The redistricting paradox ultimately reflects broader limitations in electoral engineering. While parties can influence electoral outcomes through district design, they cannot fully control the complex dynamics of democratic competition. Voter preferences change, opposition parties adapt, and institutional constraints limit the most extreme strategies.

Moreover, the pursuit of permanent majority status through redistricting may be self-defeating. Parties that focus extensively on gaming the electoral system may neglect the substantive policy work and coalition-building that sustains long-term political success. The resources devoted to redistricting battles might be better spent on candidate recruitment, policy development, or voter outreach.

The American political system’s federalism also creates natural limits on partisan gerrymandering. While parties can control redistricting within individual states, they cannot coordinate redistricting across state boundaries. This means that even successful state-level gerrymandering cannot create permanent majorities at the national level.

Implications for Democratic Governance

The failure of ruling parties to create permanent majorities through redistricting may actually be a strength of American democracy rather than a weakness. The continued competitiveness of elections, even in the face of sophisticated gerrymandering attempts, suggests that democratic competition remains robust.

However, this should not diminish concerns about the effects of partisan gerrymandering on democratic representation. Even if gerrymandering cannot create permanent majorities, it can still reduce electoral competition, increase polarization, and distort representation. The fact that extreme gerrymandering is ultimately self-limiting doesn’t make it normatively acceptable.

The redistricting paradox also highlights the importance of institutional design in democratic systems. The constraints that prevent permanent gerrymandering—legal requirements, strategic adaptation, collective action problems—are not accidental features of American democracy but rather the result of institutional choices that promote competitive elections and democratic accountability.

The puzzle of why ruling parties don’t create permanent legislative majorities through redistricting reveals the complex dynamics of democratic competition. While the theoretical possibility exists and the tools are available, the reality involves information constraints, collective action problems, strategic adaptation, and institutional limitations that prevent the most extreme outcomes. This short essay proposes a provocative question, offers some preliminary assessments, but does not evaluate the relative merits of different accounts using data. By identifying this question, the author hopes to motivate future research on this important and interesting issue.